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Abstract—Experts and practitioners have worked long and
hard toward achieving functionally capable robots. While nu-
merous areas of progress have been achieved, ethical control of
unmanned systems meeting legal requirements has been elusive
and problematic. Common conclusions that treat ethical robots as
an always-amoral philosophical conundrum requiring undemon-
strated morality-based artificial intelligence are simply not sensi-
ble or repeatable. Patterning after successful practice by human
teams shows that precise mission definition and task execution us-
ing well-defined, syntactically valid vocabularies is a necessary first
step. Addition of operational constraints enables humans to place
limits on robot activities, even when operating at a distance under
gapped communications. Semantic validation can then be provided
by a Mission Execution Ontology to confirm that no logical or le-
gal contradictions are present in mission orders. Thorough sim-
ulation, testing, and certification of qualified robot responses are
necessary to build human authority and trust when directing eth-
ical robot operations at a distance. Together these capabilities can
provide safeguards for autonomous robots possessing the potential
for lethal force. This approach appears to have broad usefulness
for both civil and military application of unmanned systems at sea.
Index Terms—Autonomous vehicles, mission execution au-
tomata (MEA), mission execution ontology (MEO), robot ethics.
I. NATURE OF ETHICAL MISSIONS
EXPERTS and practitioners have worked long and hardtoward achieving functionally capable robots. While nu-
merous areas of progress have been achieved, progress in ethical
control of unmanned systems has been elusive and problematic.
Common conclusions that treat ethical robots as an always-
amoral philosophical conundrum or requiring undemonstrated
morality-based artificial intelligence (AI) are simply not sensi-
ble or repeatable. For better or worse, actors around the world
are rapidly designing and deploying mobile unmanned systems
to augment human capabilities. Thus, theory must rise to meet
practice.
This work adapts policies and procedures for ethical respon-
sibility and authority that have been proven to work in collab-
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orative military operations, even across varying cultures and
platforms. Patterning after successful practice by human teams
shows that precise mission definition and task execution can pro-
vide safeguards for autonomous robots or human–robot teams
possessing potentially lethal capabilities. Since lethality is not
limited to military weapons but can also include navigational
interference and vehicle collisions, and since many robots are
capable of carrying out well-defined tasks regardless of their in-
ternal software architecture, this approach appears to have broad
usefulness for civil application of unmanned systems as well.
Experience and experimentation across four decades of
robotic and military operations inform this work. The authors
first look at unmanned capabilities and limitations, along
with real-world exemplars of how humans delegate command
responsibility and authority. Robot mission tasks and goals can
be clearly specified and refined with corresponding degrees of
internal control supervision occurring, in the case of the exem-
plar discussed here as part of a three-layer software architecture.
The Autonomous Vehicle Command Language (AVCL) [1]–[4]
allows expressing such mission constructs in a formal yet
human-understandable way, matching the repertoires of most
human-driven and robot-supervised vehicles. Adding well-
defined prerequisite constraints (permission, restriction, and
required human intervention) can supplement mission orders in
context of each individual task, providing an ethical basis for
unmanned system tasking that matches human understanding
of similar responsibilities. Careful structuring of a mission ex-
ecution automation (MEA) demonstrates a theoretically sound
and scalable basis to this approach. The functional vocabulary
is intentionally restricted to the well-understood mission
capabilities of humans and robots so that broad compatibility
by many robots is possible. Strict-subset vocabularies might
alternatively implement these atomic concepts using slightly
different syntax, but the core concepts must remain consistent.
Modeling, simulation, and visualization have enabled exten-
sive testing of mission operations, building human confidence
in well-defined task orders. The Extensible Markup Language
(XML) validation of AVCL tasks confirms syntactical correct-
ness of mission orders, but more is needed. The authors therefore
have created a Mission Execution Ontology (MEO) based on
principles of description logics (DLs), and implemented using
Semantic Web languages. This ontology is used to confirm
that mission definitions are also semantically complete,
including ethical constraints whenever appropriate. Such
premission verification of mission completeness is analogous to
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chain-of-command human review of operations orders that
already occurs before coordinated team operations.
A long trail has led to this point, inspired by many sources
but driven by a need to implement practical constraints on
unmanned systems lethality. A feasible path forward now exists
[5]. Semantic coherence of mission orders for humans and
robots working together can be achieved if tasks include ethical
constraints that define acceptable operational prerequisites for
remote action. Current project conclusions show that much
work remains for ethical control of robots, but progress is indeed
possible and quite encouraging. The authors believe that ethical
human supervision of semiautonomous unmanned systems is
feasible today and widely repeatable in a practical manner.
II. CONSIDERING CRITICAL CHALLENGES
The idea of intelligent robots emerged from and developed in
the minds of artists and dreamers long before the prevailing tech-
nology was capable of supporting its underlying premises. First
imagined using the term “robot” in the Czech play Rossum’s
Universal Robots [6], these intelligent humanoid machines were
relegated primarily to the realm of science fiction in the first half
of the twentieth century. Even so, the ethical ramifications of
mobile (and potentially lethal) machines capable of human-like
intelligence and actions were readily apparent, and seemingly
reasonable ethical frameworks, most notably Azimov’s Three
Laws of Robotics [7], were devised to govern intelligent robot
operation. As science fiction aficionados are well aware, then
and now, these frameworks were rife with loopholes and unan-
ticipated subtleties that inevitably led to their downfall.
The advent of digital computing, the emergence of AI as an
academic discipline, and the simultaneous incorporation of both
into a variety of robotic devices have brought these ethical con-
cerns to the forefront of academic and practical debate. More-
over, the ready availability of this technology to governments,
corporations, research entities, and individuals has made this
issue one of broad societal importance. From robotic vacuum
cleaners to armed military drones, intelligent robotic technol-
ogy has insinuated itself into aspects of our lives that were not
previously imagined. One implication of this ubiquity is that
questions of legal and moral responsibility will not be answered
by a set of fixed “laws” and cannot be regulated into irrelevance
through government action, just as is the case of endeavors in-
volving humans.
Nevertheless, a number of important observations can be
made, which are as follows.
1) Predictability: Robots essentially perform exactly as pro-
grammed to perform in a given situation. Predictability is
independent of the intent of the programmer, the under-
standing of the operator, and any anthropomorphic bias of
observers. Thus, a trustworthy robot must be sufficiently
competent to perform assigned tasks.
2) Authority: Apparent intelligence notwithstanding, a robot
is an inanimate object. Thus, moral responsibility for the
consequences of a robot’s actions cannot be assigned to
the robot. Decision-making authority must be performed
by qualified, well-informed humans.
3) Responsibility: Direct responsibility for the outcomes of
robot activity must accompany authority, and must be
assignable to a specific human entity. For robot ethics
to bear any tangible meaning, ultimate moral and legal
accountability must reside with the human programmers,
manufacturers, operators, and leadership. Deliberate care
must be taken when giving orders to robots, just as is
already given for orders to humans.
4) Liability: The assignment of liability (whether legal or
moral) in any circumstance is premised on the assump-
tion that the involved parties are in a position to reasonably
foresee the outcomes for which they are being held respon-
sible. Liability accompanies authority and responsibility.
These observations are fairly widely accepted, but neverthe-
less can lead ethicists to different conclusions. In debating mil-
itary use of autonomous systems, for instance, Rob Sparrow of
the International Committee for Robot Arms Control uses Jus
en Bello requirements to argue that the military use of lethal
robots is inherently unethical because robots cannot be held ac-
countable for their actions [8]. Ronald Arkin, on the other hand,
accepts the premises of Sparrow’s argument but comes to the
opposite conclusion—that if an autonomous system is capable
of making a lethal decision more reliably than a human, then it
is inherently unethical to not use that system [9].
Notwithstanding disagreements over military use of au-
tonomous robots, these observations can form a common basis
that provides a framework for ethical operation of intelligent
robots afloat. This approach is feasible with current technolo-
gies and without a requirement for black-box AI “ethical con-
trollers” that do not integrate well with specialized software
schemes and inevitably lead to second-guessing, obfuscation,
and uncertainty. Further, this paradigm is potentially applicable
not only to military operations (lethal or otherwise) but also to
other employment of robotic systems, where questions of ethical
operation and responsibility arise [10] [11].
Human-directed unmanned systems must follow the well-
established legal principle of vicarious liability [12] in both
military and civilian applications, where operators can be held
morally and legally responsible for all outcomes from a robot’s
activities if they are in a position to foresee those outcomes. That
is, operators can be held responsible for undesirable outcomes
that they are in a position to prevent. Such outcomes are highly
significant, from both moral and legal perspectives, if property
or lives are lost [13]–[17].
III. MISSION DEFINITION AS GOALS OR TASKS WITH
RUNTIME CONSTRAINTS
A. Goal Definition and Task Decomposition
Research by the authors and our colleagues at the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, USA, relating to
unmanned maritime vehicle mission definition and control has
extended over a period of more than two decades, and has
included successful open-ocean testing of two autonomous
vehicles [1], [2], [18], [19]. Based on these efforts and prior
operational experiences with vehicles afloat, the authors rec-
ognized the need to view maritime robot software development
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Fig. 1. RBM software architecture is based on hierarchical control paradigm
of naval vessels [21].
from both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective, and have
incorporated both approaches into a trilevel software archi-
tecture called the rational behavior model (RBM) [20], [21].
The RBM architecture involves three layers, each requiring
different types of software roles corresponding to human roles.
A variety of other three-level robot architectures have been
proposed and implemented over the past two decades, typically
robot-specific rather than generally repeatable, often with
similar timing principles and varying jargon [22]–[24]. RBM
is modeled on the command hierarchy of manned ships and
aircraft, organizing robot control requirements into execution,
tactical, and strategic levels as depicted in Fig. 1.
Specific details regarding the design characteristics of each
RBM level follows.
1) Execution level control includes those hard-real-time un-
interruptable tasks associated with control and manage-
ment of hardware systems that directly interact with the
vehicle’s physical environment. These feedback-driven
controllers correspond to the activities of a manned ves-
sel’s junior crew members and include manipulation of
control surfaces and sensors. Typically, most execution-
level software is provided by the manufacturer of a given
robotic vehicle.
2) Tactical level tasks direct execution level functionality to
realize more complex behaviors. Task behaviors corre-
spond to management by a manned vessel’s watch offi-
cers and can be as simple as directing a desired course and
speed, or transiting to an ordered geographic location, or
conducting specialized tasks such as an area search, map-
ping, rendezvous, etc.
3) Strategic level goals are at the highest level of control
and correspond to guidance directed by a manned vessel’s
commander. These goals control overall mission conduct
by triggering tactical level behaviors.
The RBM strategic level is entirely concerned with carrying
out mission logic. Any form of mission definition at this level
can be formalized as a finite state machine (FSM) in which each
node of the machine’s state graph corresponds to commanding
(calling) a tactical behavior, with subsequent logical branching
depending on the value returned by the behavior.
The RBM tactical level carries out mission tasks, typically
using a vehicle controller and discrete decision process similar
to the depiction in Fig. 2 [25]. With this model, the controller
Fig. 2. Strategic level task sequencing algorithm for mission conduct as a
series of discrete mission tasks and associated decisions [25].
periodically takes stock of the current situation, determines sta-
tus of the current task, and proceeds to the next task when the
current one is complete. Tactical level RBM software modules
are often referred to simply as behaviors [4], [5] and are exe-
cuted primarily for their “side effects” that accomplish activity
by invoking execution level atomic behaviors. That is, behav-
iors cause the vehicle to interact with its environment, internal
or external, to accomplish a specific mission goal or subgoal.
Tactical behaviors return result values from a carefully de-
fined finite set. Original work demonstrated broad tasking flex-
ibility using either Boolean success or failure. Superior mission
flow logic is possible using ternary values, i.e., success, fail-
ure, or exception. Example exceptions are expressed simply as
constraints, for example “task incomplete due to phase time-
out” or “task canceled due to (potentially) violating an ethical
constraint” [5].
Execution-level processes provide closed-loop and open-
control of vehicle effectors and actuators (such as propellers,
rudders, actuators, etc.). Execution level commands often match
common human commands such as “Come Left to Course
North,” “All Stop,” or “All Engines Ahead Full.” In practice, this
type of decision process is commonly referred to as a sense–
decide–act (SDA) loop when referring to overall control loops
for computational autonomous agent activities, or sometimes
a sense–interpret–decide–act loop when emphasizing machine
evaluation of sensor inputs [26]. Comparable patterns for ef-
fective human behavior are characterized as observe–orient–
decide–act (OODA) loops [27].
The motivation for adopting RBM in human/robot mission
software development is to avoid enigmatic and monolithic
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Fig. 3. Plain-language strategic level search and sample mission, providing well-structured success-failure branching for human approval [32]. This mission is
also displayed graphically in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Binary strategic-level mission flow graph depicting transition logic
of exemplar search and sample mission, suitable for human approval of com-
prehensive mission orders to unmanned systems [33]. Mission corresponds to
human-directed goals in Fig. 3.
software, and instead use layered software based on metaphors
familiar to human beings in exercising their duties at each level
of a mission [21], [20]. Evidently, this kind of approach allows
assignment of responsibility to just one human being for any
tested mission capability, thereby eliminating “finger pointing”
and confusion in case of mission failure due to either conflicted
guidance or coding errors. Such structuring enables coherent
robot/human mission control software so that necessary levels
of human accountability can be assured. Figs. 3 and 4 show a
plain-language mission description with matching mission-flow
logic, suitable for human supervisory approval and autonomous
system tasking.
B. Premission Testing and Flow Graphs
In order for every possible path through a strategic level graph
to be exhaustively traced by the responsible mission specialist
to ensure its correctness, mission-flow tasking must be acyclic
and free of sequencing loops. Such a graph can be said to be
fully testable in the sense that a knowledgeable human being
can certify that every possible sequence of values returned from
successive phase execution results in the desired outcome. That
is, if loop free, the mission graph can be manually fully validated
and can serve as the formal basis for specifying mission control
code.
Multiphase missions planned and executed by human beings
typically begin with a clearly stated high-level objective. Then,
utilizing trusted behaviors executable by subordinate units (or
by corresponding software modules), individual mission phases
are defined and then connected to form (implicitly or explicitly)
a directed graph, such as Fig. 4, often called a process flow graph.
If there are no branches in this graph, it is sometimes called a
script. In a well-controlled and thoroughly understood environ-
ment, a script is often sufficient for human tasking. However,
for robot execution, or for humans in an uncertain or hostile en-
vironment, phase failure must be explicitly accounted for. This
is accomplished by branching based on a predefined finite set of
possible phase-execution outcomes. Fig. 4 illustrates specifica-
tion of a maritime mission in which phase outcomes are binary
choices. That is, as can be seen, each phase ends with either
success or failure.
It is commonplace in the civilian world to specify complex
multiphase tasks by means of binary process flow graphs. It
is our belief that such graphs are understood well enough by
the population as a whole that they can be used in trials and
other legal proceedings to establish ownership of processes and
procedures as well as liability in cases of product failure. They
are therefore highly suitable for human use in specifying mission
orders at a strategic level. Moreover, any acyclic flow graph
can be exhaustively tested and documented as a quantitative
proof that the specified graph correctly implements the intended
mission [5].
C. MEA: Reinterpreting Mission Flow Graphs
Since the strategic level of RBM is based on logic, at first
it appeared that predicate calculus might be needed in its im-
plementation, and that strategic level mission execution is most
properly viewed as theorem proving. Therefore, the Prolog (pro-
gramming in logic) language [28] was chosen for implementing
the strategic level of initial sea trials with the Phoenix AUV [4].
In these experiments, mission phases and branching, defined in
Prolog, were activated by querying a top-level mission predicate.
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TABLE I
FORMAL MATHEMATICAL DEFINITION OF MISSION EXECUTION AUTOMATON (MEA)
MEA is formally defined as follows:
M = (Q, Γi , Γr , b, δ, γ, q0 , F ),
where:
Q = a finite, non-empty set of states
Γi = a non-empty set of input symbols corresponding to behavior-initiation function calls to the tactical level
(note, once parameterization of function calls is taken into consideration, this set is of potentially infinite size but
is practically constrained to a finite set by γ)
Γr = a finite, non-empty set of response symbols corresponding to return values from behavior function calls
b ∈ Γi is a blank and equates to no function call (note, since no function call is made, no response will be
received, so execution will halt in the current state)
δ : (Q F ) × Γr → Q is the transition function mapping a current state and response to a new state
γ : Q → Γi is the behavior call function that maps a state to a behavior-initiation function call
q0 ∈ Q is the initial state
F ⊆ Q is the set of final states which equate (if the mission is constructed correctly) to mission termination
Constraints can be added explicitly to the definition by adding a set of constraints C ,
a constraint-mapping function τ : Q → c ⊆ C , and modifying both Γi and γ to account for τ .
While testing was successful, and the vehicle returned safely,
there was no means of verifying mission correctness since pred-
icate calculus is generally not provable. That is, a set of facts
and rules defining a formal system cannot, in general, be shown
to be complete and free of contradictions [29]–[32].
In an attempt to achieve mission provability in a second un-
manned underwater vehicle (UUV), the Aries [2], rule-based
mission definitions were adapted as active state graphs such as
described above. That is, while still using Prolog for exhaustive
premission testing of mission flow graphs, in-water real-time
software treated each mission phase as a software object, with
associated methods to accomplish phase actions and transitions.
A task sequencer was added to properly cycle through the phases
of a mission in response to values returned from calls to phase
methods. Such return values, in turn, come from an external
agent that might be either a human being or a mechanical sys-
tem (robot, external memory, etc.). Fig. 2 defines the action of
such a sequencer.
In the programming environment for Aries, called “AUV
Workbench,” [2], [33] a graphical menu system is used to define
a mission state graph that was then incorporated with a mis-
sion sequencer to produce real-time code for the strategic level.
In this case, since Aries was fully autonomous, queries from
phases were directed entirely to the tactical level software with
Aries itself acting as the sole external agent for the active state
graph (FSM) directing the mission.
From an algorithmic perspective, it is noteworthy that “be-
havior call functions” are the same as the “external agent com-
munication functions” previously defined in [32], [34]. It should
also be recognized that, in case the MEA has an external one-
dimensional memory (i.e., a bidirectional tape recorder) as its
only external agent, then it is exactly a Turing machine (TM)
[30], [35], [32]. This is important because, as is well known in
computer science, a TM can return a value for any computable
function. This means that any alternative means for implement-
ing the strategic level of the RBM architecture cannot be more
computationally expressive or powerful than an MEA. This is
an important and previously unreported finding of the present
paper. Table I provides a formal definition of the MEA.
Based on formal principles of computational theory, it is fur-
ther possible to define and implement a universal TM (UTM)
in which the state table for a specific machine is stored on the
“tape” of the UTM [30]. Likewise, it is possible to transform any
given MEA into a mission execution engine (MEE) with a corre-
sponding file holding mission orders. Such an MEE, along with
mission orders for the mission of Figs. 3 and 4, has been math-
ematically defined in executable predicate calculus form using
the Prolog programming language [28], [32]. Interpretation and
execution of this mission by the MEE provide a mathematically
rigorous basis for comparable implementations using any other
computer language.
D. Progressive Goal Refinement
In describing complex tasks to subordinates, humans often
subdivide these tasks into a series of subordinate tasks that can
be executed to accomplish the overall mission. For instance, a
complex task (or mission) during which a manned vehicle is
expected to conduct searches and collect environmental sam-
ples before rendezvousing with another manned (or unmanned)
vehicle might be specified as a series of tasks as depicted in
Fig. 4. Providing the vehicle’s operator knows the geographic
characteristics of areas A, B, and C and understands what the
commander means in directing searches, environmental sam-
pling, and rendezvous, the operator is able to reliably execute
this mission as specified.
Note that each of the above tasks is nontrivial. Most tasks
include transit as well as subsequent operations in different
locations. Each task requires multiple sophisticated steps for
successful completion, whether accomplished by a human or
a robot. Each subtask typically requires even more special-
ized capabilities. For example transit requires safe navigation,
which requires sensing and classification for situational aware-
ness plus stable control, which in turn requires operation of
hardware/software capabilities, and so on. Each level of abstrac-
tion requires different capabilities and sophistication, while no
layer of capability can exist correctly without the correspond-
ing layers of functionality that lie above and below. Thus, task
decomposability is essential.
It is evident that an MEA can actually carry out the mission it
defines only when it is properly structured for a given vehicle and
mission. One obvious requirement is that all phases in a given
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Fig. 5. Progressive refinement, illustrating the internal flow graph for grid-
based depth-first search of area A, corresponding to necessary subgoals within
goal 1 of Fig. 4, adapted from [35].
MEA graph must correspond to an available top-level trusted
behavior. Consider, for example the case that a general open-
ocean area search trusted behavior is available (such as a box
search or spiral search [1]), but that area A, referred to in Fig. 4,
is in fact a coastal area known to be full of unmapped rocks
and shoals. In such a case, an entirely different type of search
is called for. In particular, if the vehicle always knows where it
is in global coordinates (through GPS, inertial navigation, etc.),
depth-first search, widely utilized in AI applications, can be used
[36]. Fig. 5 below illustrates one implementation of depth-first
search appropriate to grid-based terrain exploration.
Superficially, Fig. 5 resembles Fig. 4 of this paper. However,
thoughtful analysis shows several important differences. First
of all, Fig. 5 contains several loops. This means it cannot be
exhaustively tested except for a given terrain example with a
finite number of cells. Even then, possible user response se-
quences would likely be so long and so many in number as to
make exhaustive testing infeasible. Further, such a test would
be valid only for the given terrain. Thus, the depth-first search
algorithm of Fig. 5 is not exhaustively testable and thus is not
suitable for use as a top-level behavior in an overall mission
graph. Moreover, backtracking requires either physical terrain
marking (generally undesirable or infeasible in military opera-
tions) or construction of a map (implying an external memory).
In case a map is used, this requires external storage, and the
MEA then becomes a variety of TM. However, it is generally
known that the correctness of a given TM might not be provable.
What can be done about this?
Fortunately, depth-first search as presented here mechanizes
a classic trail-blazing method used by human explorers in seek-
ing a goal. This method is known to always succeed when the
number of cells to be searched is finite. Thus, it can be used
as a trusted behavior, though not at a top level, because the
time required to search an arbitrary terrain cannot be predicted.
This shortcoming can be overcome by a slight modification to
Fig. 5 that causes it to return a value of failure (i.e., exception)
if a specified time duration (since search commencement) is
reached. Thus, the inability of depth-first search to complete
due to a time-out failure is not as serious as it might seem at
first. Specifically, as can be seen from Fig. 4, the overall mission
plan makes provision for such a “giving up too soon” failure,
and simply sequences the next goal which is to search area B.
E. Classical Decision Logic for Task Sequencing
It is noteworthy that similar SDA or OODA control-loop mod-
els can be applied to both human and nonhuman operators. Such
correspondences imply that missions thus specified might be ex-
ecutable not only by humans, but by human-controlled robots,
human–robot teams, and carefully constrained autonomous
robots as well. However, one important aspect of the mission
above must be accounted for. Simple sequential execution of
tasks as in a mission script implicitly assumes success for each
task. Where human operators are concerned, this is acceptable
in most circumstances. When the ability to complete a task
is in question, a human operator is able to request guidance
from higher authority or use his best judgment to decide how
to proceed. Under the requirements underpinning the frame-
work proposed in this paper, this is not necessarily an option
for robot agents. Rather, the course of action that the vehicle is
to undertake in the event of task failure must be fully specified
in the mission description. This can be achieved through the
introduction of a simple branching structure.
As discussed previously, a specific autonomous agent may
be trusted to execute a finite set of atomic behaviors that are
used to define the mission. Further, the agent must be capable of
detecting when a behavior is successfully completed and when
the behavior cannot be successfully completed. It follows that
a vehicle must be able to detect the success or failure of tasks
within the mission definition so long as those tasks are com-
prised of trusted behaviors. This capability makes it possible to
more rigorously define missions in a way that target autonomous
vehicles can be trusted to execute without direct supervision.
With the introduction of potential branching based on task
success or failure, overall mission success is no longer reliant on
a fixed sequence of task executions. In fact, a particular mission
can include the successful completion of some tasks, the failure
of different tasks, and the complete omission of others. It is
appropriate in this context to refer to the individual tasks as
goals to be achieved rather than simply as tasks. Interestingly,
the SDA/OODA decision loop of Fig. 2 is still suitable for
controlling the execution of this revised mission.
The binary-branching flow graph in Fig. 4 is one among
many potential representational forms for this and many other
missions, and a number of graphical, programmatic, and XML-
based definition forms have been proposed [1]–[3]. This flow-
graph encoding is of particular interest because it provides an
intuitive depiction of a potentially complex mission. In fact,
an operator or supervisor can utilize a mission specification of
this form to mentally “rehearse” the mission by intentionally
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Fig. 6. Constraints suitable for careful prior human supervision of robot actions in the exemplar search and sample mission.
traversing the graph from start to finish while exhaustively test-
ing success and failure branches at every step. While not yet
providing the required level of mathematical rigor, this ability
to informally traverse all possible task sequences in this manner
is an important step toward providing assurance to the responsi-
ble operator that the mission will progress according to human
intent under all foreseeable circumstances.
F. Adding Constraints to Mission Decision Logic
As presented so far, this mission definition paradigm does
not explicitly address the issue of ethical mission execution.
Specifically, no mechanism has been suggested at this stage
to define ethical constraints affecting the overall mission or
individual tasks. It might be casually argued that ethical conduct
is implied by “successful” completion of goal’s requirements.
However, such an assumption is naı̈ve and does not provide
nearly enough confidence for the operator to assume liability for
the mission’s conduct. For instance, it is apparent that an UUV
with an appropriate search behavior can achieve goals 1 and 3 of
the example mission. Unfortunately, it may or may not be able to
do so while avoiding detection, remaining clear of other vehicles
in the area, or maintaining a specific navigational accuracy. If
any of these (or other) conditional requirements must be met in
order for the goal to be achieved in a safe and ethical manner,
then an additional mechanism must be provided to incorporate
those ethical constraints into the mission specification.
Common approaches to ethical oversight presume the ex-
istence of some oracular agent equipped with morality and
philosophical knowledge. We specifically reject such notions
as ill-defined, not implementable, untestable, and an abdication
of necessary human responsibility. A more practical approach
is necessary that keeps human operators “in charge” of robot
actions, even when operating at a distance with gapped commu-
nications [5], [16], [15].
Constraints on mission tasks are far more precise and effec-
tive, matching common human practices. In a mission context,
ethical constraints do not describe characteristics of individual
goals, but rather what must be considered and enforced during
goal execution. From the standpoint of operator accountability,
the constraints must be specified in a manner that preserves the
ability to trace high-level mission flow, and also specified in a
way that can ultimately be monitorable and enforceable by the
autonomous vehicles themselves. A plain-language version of
legitimate constraints is given in Fig. 6.
Ethical constraints vary and may be intuitively applied to
either an entire mission or to relevant individual goals as ap-
propriate. That is, there may be certain constraints that must
be enforced from launch until recovery (e.g., all safety systems
must remain operational), and others that only need to be en-
forced during the execution of specific goals (e.g., maintaining
safety depth in the search area).
Up to this point, the definition scheme only provides for bi-
nary branching of the mission-flow diagram: Once initiated, a
goal either succeeds or fails, and the mission then proceeds ac-
cordingly. Such a representation is fully representative of any
decision tree, since tree graphs of arbitrary branching size can be
traversed in a binary manner. However, a binary approach also
presumes that an impending ethical constraint violation equates
to goal failure. Such equivalence might be acceptable in many
cases, and ethical violations causing goal failure certainly result
in correct application of the constraints in the sense that goal
execution no longer proceeds in the face of constraint violations.
On the other hand, it might well be desirable to treat responses
to impending constraint violations differently than simple fail-
ure (for example, to meet an additional independent objective).
A more-responsive approach is possible through the addition
of a third potential goal-execution outcome for constraint vi-
olations, along with a corresponding branching option in the
mission flow structure. That is, execution of an individual goal
becomes terminated upon goal success, goal failure, or impend-
ing violation of a constraint applied to that goal. Flow of control
then proceeds as directed to whichever subsequent goal is next
designated as appropriate.
The question before us now is to find a way of modifying
the binary-branching approach of Fig. 4 to include these lim-
itations on vehicle behavior into the mission state graph. An
excellent solution turns out to be remarkably straightforward.
All that is required is to allow ternary branching in this graph
with the third branch applying to situations when a constraint
is about to be violated. This constraint-based tree approach is
shown in Fig. 7. It is quite useful and an excellent match for su-
pervisory planning needed when humans perform robot mission
planning. The general expressive power of binary-flow logic is
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Fig. 7. Mission-flow graph for a search and sample mission with ternary
branching for imminent ethical-constraint violations. Constraint definitions are
provided in Fig. 6.
preserved, and system responses must be explicitly considered
for each success, failure, or constraint violation that might occur
when performing each mission goal. The ternary-flow structure
is also similar to exception handling in modern programming
languages, which can facilitate implementation and testing.
G. Implications of Ethical Constraints on Mission Tasking
Designing robot missions in the form of a flow diagram con-
sisting of a set of discrete goals, with ethical constraints applied
to individual goals as described here, provides an intuitive mech-
anism that can enhance responsible operators’ understanding of
the missions they expect to supervise. The nature of the mission
specification is declarative. At this level of abstraction, individ-
ual goals execute sequentially according to the mission graph,
irrespective of elapsed time, and each goal predictably termi-
nates in one of three possible states (goal success, goal failure,
or constraint violation).
Supervisory trust that a directed vehicle can execute specific
goals, recognize goal failure, and identify pending constraint
violations provides important boundaries on autonomous be-
havior. Essentially this approach eliminates any need to make
assumptions or guesses concerning intended vehicle conduct
during goal execution. Rather, the necessary requirement of
well-specified tasking is specifically placed on human operators
to create well-defined and thorough missions. Further, if the
size of the mission-flow diagram is reasonably managed, then
exhaustive testing of all possible mission execution sequences
is achievable and tractable. These aspects of mission design are
fundamentally important, and are essentially quite similar to the
essence of coordinated operational tasking among ships and air-
craft led by responsible and cooperating humans. Section III-H
strengthens the foundations for these concepts. Examining the
underlying nature of the mathematical formalizations used here
can provide further operator assurance that a particular mis-
sion is appropriately defined and can proceed as expected, in an
appropriate matter, under all circumstances.
H. Summary of Insights, MEA
As a generalization of the TM, the MEA provides a mathemat-
ically sound approach to the definition and exhaustive testing
of unmanned vehicle missions. The MEA includes a mission-
specific FSM and unlimited memory. Consistent with the MEA
generalization, the TM tape can be replaced by a physical robot
or a human being to which output can be sent (commands)
and inputs can be received (e.g., success, failure, or constraint-
violation responses). Other external agents can be optionally
added as well.
To guarantee eventual termination of a mission, the structure
of a strategic level mission must be constrained somewhat be-
yond the basic MEA definition. Specifically, the mission FSM
cannot include loops, unreachable states, or sink states (i.e., non-
terminal states from which further transitions are not possible).
Further, the strategic level mission must be defined with few
enough states and transitions to allow for tractable exhaustive
testing by a human operator. However, when a strategic level
goal is iteratively refined to develop a tactical level behavior
(as with the depth-first search example) these restrictions do not
apply since the tactical level can implement a timeout failure to
ensure termination of individual behaviors.
Finally, a universal MEA can be achieved by implementing
sequencing and communication functions as a separate MEE
and then developing the mission flow graph as a set of mission
orders in a form understandable by both the MEE and humans
who are mission specialists, but who may not be programmers.
There are many choices for expressing such mission orders
including flow charts, text-based programming languages, and
graphical user interface techniques.
IV. VALIDATION OF RBM SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
THROUGH REAL-WORLD AND VIRTUAL EXPERIMENTATION
A. Testing Control-Logic Responses
Frequently applying the double-check question “how might a
human accomplish this task?” is an important design principle
for autonomous-system mission production. Simulation testing
can help demonstrate mission clarity and expected responses
at all levels of sophistication. Fig. 8 shows an example human-
directed simulation trace of RBM control logic. Of further inter-
est is that both mission tasking and supervisor inquiry/response
are similar to the qualification testing required of human oper-
ators performing similar roles.
A similarly capable, independent implementation uses the Hi-
erarchical Task Network behavior model and Python program-
ming language in the Combined Arms Analysis Tool for the
21st Century (COMBATXXI), a simulation tool developed and
used by the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps within various
analytic studies [37], [38].
Long-duration robot missions may have lengthy mission or-
ders. The ability to test missions exhaustively through man-
ual or automatic means, together with the ability to isolate
faults, is an important design requirement. Testability pro-
vides a significant boost to improving human confidence that
robots can correctly perform assigned tasks in an appropriate
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Fig. 8. Typical execution traces from exhaustive premission strategic level testing of the exemplar search mission with ethical constraints depicted in Fig. 7,
tested using MEA Prolog source code (bold font indicates operator input).
order, and also correctly avoid prohibited situations forbidden
by constraints. Testability also enables eventual certification of
otherwise-diverse robot systems as “qualified” to follow human
direction competently, similar to certification requirements for
any other human-directed vehicle.
B. Mission Representations and Syntactic Validation
Up to this point, all results presented have related to the
strategic level and the tactical level of RBM software for a
single example of a “search and sample” mission for a no-
tional autonomous underwater vehicle. Furthermore, all results
presented thus far have been obtained from high-level mission
simulations typically written in the Prolog logic-programming
language. However, beginning in 1993, in parallel with formal-
ization and publication of details of RBM [20], [21], the authors
and their collaborators demonstrated the value and practicality
of this approach for undersea robots through a series of open-
ocean experiments involving two small unmanned submarines.
Alternatives have been implemented and tested using Allegro
Common Lisp and the C language integrated production system
(CLIPS) rule-based expert system [39], thus further demon-
strating functional correctness whether using forward chaining
or backwards chaining to resolve task logic. These experiments
and results obtained are summarized in the following sections.
Aries AUV missions were defined with AVCL, a schema-
constrained XML data model supporting autonomous vehicle
mission definition, execution, and management [1]–[4]. While
the mathematical concept of an MEA had not been developed
at the time of AVCL’s development, AVCL does provide a fixed
set of goal types including area search, environmental sampling,
and rendezvous and is thus suitable for the definition of mission
flow diagrams such as the one depicted in Figs. 3 and 4. Further,
AVCL was intentionally designed to support implementation
of the RBM strategic and tactical levels and was utilized to
Fig. 9. XML-based AVCL specification of Goal 1 from Fig. 7 for execution
on the NPS Aries UUV [1].
define RBM-controlled Aries missions for simulation in the
AUV Workbench virtual environment and for open-ocean real-
world tests.
As an example, consider the XML snippet of Fig. 9, which
provides a hypothetical description of goal 1 from Figs. 3 and 4
for execution by a UUV. This specification defines the type of
search to be conducted (area search for multiple targets with an
expected probability of detection of 0.8), the area to be searched
(a 500 by 3000-m rectangular area with a northwest corner at
36.7 north latitude and 121.9 west longitude), and stipulates
that the search be conducted at a depth of between 25 and
50 m. Evidently, the search goal definition describes what is
required for successful completion of the goal. However, it does
not dictate precisely how the goal is to be completed since such
navigation and maneuvering decisions remain the responsibility
of the tactical-level implementation.
Simulation of a mission consisting of an AVCL specification
for a search goal similar to the one in Fig. 9 and avoid areas
specified as constraints in the AUV Workbench is shown in
Fig. 10. During the mission, the tactical level plans a path and
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Fig. 10. AVCL mission SimpleBoxTest.xml demonstrating simulated conduct of a goal-oriented mission that was performed amidst constraints [19]. Simulation
replay rendering produced by AUV Workbench [33].
maneuvers to the search area while remaining clear of the avoid
areas and then develops and executes a suitable pattern for the
required area search. More complicated missions demonstrating
the binary branching model were conducted in AUV Workbench
simulations and also in open-ocean experiments in Monterey
Bay [1], [33]. A comprehensive comparison and consolidation
of diverse goal types can be found in [1].
C. Dangers Associated With Using Rules and Fact Assertion
to Implement Strategic Level Logic
As described above, Phoenix missions were executed as a re-
sult of an inferencing and reasoning process, using a set of rules
and facts for mission definition. While all in-water missions
succeeded, and Phoenix was never lost at sea, this approach
provided no means of proving the correctness of strategic level
software comparable to the exhaustive testing made possible by
the MEA formalism. The authors believe that this is a serious
limitation that applies to all approaches for top-level strategic
level mission definition that require specific actions to be de-
rived from general principles rather than using a completely
concrete FSM approach.
Specifically, a set of rules and facts amounts to a formal math-
ematical system in which the rules and facts serve as axioms.
Theoretically it is known that, in general, no such set of axioms
can be proved complete. Here, completeness means that all true
theorems can be proved by formal application of predicate cal-
culus. Such computability properties are hard to prove. In fact,
to the astonishment of the entire mathematical world, Gödel
proved in 1931 that such a simple system as integer arithmetic
cannot have any axiomatic basis. Perhaps equally shocking, even
plane geometry had no sound axiomatic basis until around 50
years ago. This meant that, from a strictly formal perspective,
all of Euclid’s original “proofs” were merely plausibility argu-
ments. Fortunately, all of the theorems believed to be true are in
fact provable using the complete and consistent set of modern
algorithms [31].
The significance of the above observations relative to top
level mission specification derives from the fact that, for rule-
based systems, mission execution can sometimes be regarded
as a side effect of proving the theorem that “there exists a way
to satisfy all specified mission goals while observing all given
constraints.” If it eventually turns out that the mission axiom
set contains a contradiction, then system execution behavior
becomes unpredictable and not testable, as well as potentially
hazardous and even self-defeating.
The potential unpredictability of less-formal reasoning ap-
proaches and the inability to prove the correctness and complete-
ness of axiomatically defined missions effectively precludes
formal responsibility or liability for robot missions using these
approaches. In fact, AI approaches to top-level mission specifi-
cation and control almost invariably make use of some form of
reasoning and/or statistical pattern recognition. Applying such
broad abstractions to the innumerable situations that can arise
in the real world is very dangerous when applied to potentially
lethal robots, and also makes the assumption of responsibility
by human operators unrealistic. It is therefore apparent that the
abstract reasoning of general AI approaches is inappropriate at
the highest level of robot mission definition and control.
Algorithms cannot replace human responsibility. Even so, a
fully testable technology such as that provided by the MEA for-
malism, allows for assignment of human accountability when
directing outcomes and alternatives for robot missions. It is pos-
sible that ever-emerging AI techniques may someday provide
good methods for achieving specific individual tactical level be-
havior modules. Such employment of AI capabilities (even when
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Fig. 11. MEO characteristics applied using Semantic Web standards to support ethical operations by human–robot teams.
experimental) can be considered appropriate in these cases since
success, failure, and constraint violation remain fully accounted
for by the strategic level MEA.
V. ETHICAL VALIDATION OF MISSION DEFINITIONS
A. Description Logics
Thus far, the discussion of MEA mathematical underpin-
nings, capabilities, and implementations has focused on pro-
viding robot operators the ability to rigorously define and test
strategic level missions to ensure high-level mission-flow un-
derstanding sufficient for the assignment of accountability for
vehicle conduct throughout the mission. However, the ability
of an actual target vehicle to execute missions defined in this
manner without further translation into a vehicle-specific form
has not been addressed. Mathematical logic provides a mech-
anism for bridging strategic level missions described here and
vehicle-specific code for specifying and ordering tactical level
behaviors. If properly implemented, formal logic can mathe-
matically enforce MEA semantics in the definition of missions
and during execution of those missions on target vehicles.
DLs are a mathematical family of logic-based knowledge
representation systems that are used to describe concepts and
roles within a knowledge-based system through a set of well-
defined operations. DL ontologies can be used to describe the
requirements and relationships of a system in a semantically
meaningful way. That is, they define not only what the relation-
ships are, but how they operate, how they are to be used, and to
what specific entities they apply. DLs provide expressive power
almost equal to that of first-order logic. Further, these language
constructs have been carefully defined to enable (and indeed
guarantee) computationally efficient reasoning that can always
identify the existence of hidden relationships and errors in the
form of rule violations or contradictions [40]. These are strong
capabilities with great potential value.
Fig. 12. MEO expressing concepts and roles (i.e., relationships among con-
cepts) representing the flow-diagram MEA mission descriptions.
DLs provide the mathematical foundation of what has come to
be known as the Semantic Web, an extension of the World Wide
Web [41]. The growth of the Semantic Web has fostered the
development of tools and standards that take advantage of DL
logical expressiveness and mathematical rigor to provide exten-
sive knowledge representation, discovery, and utilization capa-
bilities. Most notably, the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [42]
together with the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [43]
encode a particularly powerful DL in a plain-text, XML-based,
computer-readable form [44]. Because of its formal and general
DL implementation, OWL is potentially useful beyond the Se-
mantic Web domain. It is used here to define a robot mission de-
scription and execution ontology that applies and enforces MEA
semantics. Further references of interest include [45], [46].
Overall correspondences between ethical characteristics imple-
mentable using Semantic Web standards is shown in Fig. 11.
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Fig. 13. Validatable RDF/OWL diagram of goals, relationships, assertions, and ethical constraints for the canonical mission of Fig. 7 plus the MEO relationships
of Fig. 12. Rules and rendering produced using Protégé Ontology Editor [49], [48].
B. MEO for Robots
The MEO serves a number of purposes. First, it provides a
formal and semantically rich description of the characteristics
of a MEA mission description. For instance, OWL expressions
are used to declare the existence of concepts such as Mission,
Goal, and Constraint. OWL statements are also used to de-
fine possible relationships (roles) between concepts. An entity
to which the Mission concept applies, for example, can have
an includes relationship with an entity to which the Goal
concept applies. Additional OWL statements describe rules that
govern how relationships are applied. As an example, a Mis-
sion entity must have an includes relationship with at least
one Goal entity and must have a startsWith relationship
with exactly one of those entities. A graphical depiction of the
concepts and relationships defined in the MEO is provided in
Fig. 12. As the diagram indicates, concepts and relationships are
defined to accurately represent the semantics of the previously
discussed flow diagrams to include the definition of individual
mission goals and constraints; goal successors in the event of
goal success, failure, or constraint termination; the mission’s
first goal; and the application of constraints either to individual
goals or throughout the entire mission.
In addition to the Mission, Goal, and Constraint
concepts that are abstracted directly from strategic level
mission-flow diagram semantics, the MEO introduces the
Vehicle concept. This concept provides the ability to include
specific target vehicles in the mission-planning process. In par-
ticular, the canExecute and canIdentify relationships
allow mission planners to explicitly assert that the intended tar-
get vehicle has a tactical level behavior capable of completing a
particular goal and recognizing potential violation of a particular
constraint, respectively. Evidently, if a mission includes goals
for which the canExecute relationship does not exist with the
intended vehicle or constraints for which the canIdentify
relationship does not exist, then that mission is not appropriate
for that particular vehicle. Given this requirement (which is
enforced by rules within the ontology), it is impossible to define
a valid mission that cannot be executed by the intended vehicle.
A second important characteristic of a DL-defined ontology is
that it not only describes the rules and relationships of a knowl-
edge domain, but also applies those rules and relationships to
entities within that domain. Stated differently, the MEO does
more than describe what the Mission, Goal, Constraint,
andVehicle concepts are and how they relate to one another. It
also allows the application of those concepts to real-world enti-
ties and the establishment of relationships among those entities.
From a practical standpoint, this means that the atomic entities
to which the Goal and Constraint concepts are applied be-
come actual executable specifications for a set of target vehicles.
C. Implementing the Ontology
OWL provides for the incorporation of atomic entities into
an ontology using uniform resource identifier (URI) labels that
uniquely identify individual entities [47]. Thus, the MEO can
be applied to the XML snippet above by defining an OWL
statement declaring its existence and corresponding identifier.
OWL statements are also used to declaratively apply concepts
to and establish relationships between atomic or composite en-
tities within the knowledge base. Fig. 13 illustrates both the
example constraint-based mission of Fig. 7 plus the MEO re-
lationships of Fig. 12, as validated and then rendered in the
Stanford Protégé ontology development tool [48], [49]. All re-
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TABLE II
LOGICAL EXPRESSIONS DEFINING CONCEPTS AND ROLES FOR MISSION PLANNING ONTOLOGY (MEO)
Rules DL Equations Plain-language description
M = Mission Rules
M1 Mission  startsWith.Goal  = 1.startsWith A Mission can only start with a Goal and must start with exactly
one Goal
M2 Mission  includes.Goal  1.includes A Mission can only include Goals and must include one of more
Goals
M3 Mission  hasConstraint.Constraint  0.hasConstraint A Mission can be constrained only by Constraints and can have 0
or more
M4 startsWith  includes A Mission must include the Goal that it starts with
M5 Mission  performableBy.Vehicle  0.performableBy A Mission can only be performed by a Vehicle and can be
performable by 0 or more Vehicles
M6 performableBy(M,V)  (hasConstraint(M,C) 
canIdentify(V,C))
A Mission cannot be performable by a Vehicle unless that Vehicle
has the ability to identify all Constraints associated with that
mission
M7 performableBy(M,V) (includes(M,G)  hasCapability(V,G)) A Mission cannot be performable by a Vehicle unless that Vehicle
has the capability to accomplish all Goals included in that Mission
V = Vehicle Rules
V1 Vehicle  hasFeature.Vehicle_Feature  0.hasFeature The only allowable features of a Vehicle are VehicleFeature. A
Vehicle can have 0 or more VehicleFeatures
V2 canPerform  performableBy- performableBy and canPerform are inversely equivalent
V3 meetsRequirement  hasFeature  canFulfill A Vehicle meets a GoalRequirement if and only if it has a
VehicleFeature that can fullfill that GoalRequirement
V4 hasFeature  canTest  canIdentify If a Vehicle has a VehicleFeature that can test a Constraint, then
that Vehicle can identify that constraint
V5 hasCapability(V,G)  (requires(G,R)  meetsRequirement(V,R)) If a Vehicle meets all GoalRequirements for a specific Goal, then
that vehicle has the capability for that Goal
F = Feature Rules
F1 VehicleFeature  canFulfill.GoalRequirement  0.canFulfill A VehicleFeature can only fulfill GoalRequirements and may be
able to fulfill 0 or more GoalRequirements
F2 VehicleFeature  can_test.Constraint  0.can_test A VehicleFeature can only test Constraints and may be able to test
0 or more Constraints
C = Constraint Rules
C1 Constraint  appliesTo.(Mission 	 Goal) A Constraint can apply to a Mission or a Goal (and nothing else)
C2 Constraint  1.appliesTo.Goal A Constraint must apply to at least one Goal
C3 appliesTo  includes  appliesTo A Constraint that applies to a Mission must also apply to all of the
Goals that Mission includes
EC = End Condition Rules
EC1 EndCondition  {SUCCEED, FAIL, VIOLATE} Possible ending conditions are SUCCEED, FAIL, and VIOLATE
(i.e., imminent Constraint violation)
G = Goal Rules
G1 Goal  requires.GoalRequirement  0.requires A Goal can only require a GoalRequirement and may require 0 or
more Goal Requirements
G2 Goal  hasEndCondition.EndCondition 

1.hasEndCondition.End_Condition
A Goal’s ending state must be an EndCondition, and a Goal can
end with at most one EndCondition
G3 Goal  isNext.Goal A Goal can only have other Goals next
G4 hasEndCondition(G,SUCCEED) 	 hasEndCondition (G,FAIL) 	
hasEndCondition (G,VIOLATE)  isNext(G,G2)
A Goal can only have an immediate successor based on the
existence of an ending state for that Goal
G5 Goal(G)  
1.(is_next(G,G2)  end_state(G,SUCCEED)) 	

1.(is_next(G,G2)  end_state(G,FAIL)) 	 
1.(is_next(G,G2) 
end_state(G,VIOLATE))
A Goal can have no more than one immediate successor in the
event of a specific ending state
G6 Goal  follows.Goal A Goal can only be followed by another Goal
G7 Goal(G)  ¬follows(G,G) A Goal cannot follow itself (no loops)
G8 isNext  follows A Goal follows another Goal if it is the next Goal
G9 follows  follows  follows follows is transitive (if follows(A,B) and follows(B,C), then
follows(A,C))
G10 includes  startsWith  follows All Goals in a Mission must potentially follow the starting Goal
(satisfiability vice entailment)
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lationships are fully and formally represented. The mission is
expressed in RDF/OWL syntax and logically validatable. Thus,
semantic validation of human orders is possible using Seman-
tic Web systems, providing a significant capability for building
human trust in safe operations by unmanned systems.
The ability to provide a full description of all goals and
constraints within the MEO using vehicle-executable code
significantly strengthens the already-powerful MEA construct.
Specifically, not only is it impossible to define a mission for a
particular vehicle without explicit canExecute relationships
between the vehicle and all mission goals and canIdentify
relationships between the vehicle and all mission constraints,
but it is also impossible to assert these relationships without
an appropriate vehicle-specific encoding of all mission goals
and constraints. Once again, human intent to meet all ethical
constraints without self-contradicting guidance is formally
confirmed through semantic validation.
Finally, automated reasoning with DL-based ontologies is an
important tool for ensuring strategic level mission validity be-
fore conducting exhaustive verification, validation, and accred-
itation (VV&A) testing using virtual simulators and real-world
operations. If, for instance, an attempt is made to finalize a
mission that includes goals that are not executable by the tar-
get vehicle, an OWL/RDF reasoner can quickly identify this
shortcoming using the MEO. Similarly, a reasoner can detect
mission flow-graph structural errors based on ontology rules that
preclude illogical loops, unreachable goals, or untasked/orphan
goals without specified predecessors or successors. A reasoner
can also simplify the mission definition process by detecting
implicit relationships that are not explicitly or correctly spec-
ified. For example, if a particular Goal entity is defined and
is reachable from the mission’s start goal (i.e., the one with
which the containing Mission has a startsWith relation-
ship) through a sequence of goal successes and failures, then
it must be in an includes relationship with that particular
mission whether the relationship is explicitly declared or not.
As described, a DL-based MEO defined in OWL ties the MEA
semantics discussed in previous sections to actual target vehi-
cles. The ontology ensures not only the validity of the mission
structure for arbitrary strategic level mission flow graphs, but
their executability on the particular target vehicles as well. Thus,
all of the requirements originally posed for assignment of human
responsibility—that the mission is defined in a mathematically
rigorous and fully-understood manner, that the mission speci-
fication is equally understandable by the human operator and
the target vehicle, and that the mission is comprised entirely
of trusted vehicle behaviors—are fully specified in the human-
approved mission orders and enforced by the strict semantics
encoded in the ontology. The relations are defined in such a way
that it permits simple customization for specific robot types.
D. Formal Specification of the Ontology
The principal concepts and relationships represented in the
mission ontology are shown in Fig. 12. Definitions of the full set
of concepts and roles (also known as classes and properties) in
this ontology satisfy a number of rules, as specified in Table II, to
support logical inferences relating to the validity of the mission
structure.
E. MEO Summary
It is possible to produce general robot mission orders that
are understandable by (legally culpable) humans and are re-
liably and safely executable by robots. The semantic repre-
sentation of the mission plans permits automated examina-
tion of the plans for logical consistency and provides an en-
hanced methodology for software implementations to process
missions. Even if perfectly executable, proper robot logic is
not useful in military context unless it is a directly compati-
ble extension of warfighter logic. Rules of engagement (ROEs),
concepts of operation, doctrine, tactics, etc., must be express-
ible in equivalent terms to be effective and usable. Constraint
tests must be determinable by a human supervisor or critic,
by a virtual environment running a simulation, or by on-board
robot sensors in the operating environment. Constraint tests can
match common guidelines such as rules of the road, water-
space management, ROEs, operational orders, and other ex-
pressions of bounds on mission conduct. These expressions
cannot be vague, must result in clear logical determinism (true
or false), must be able to combine multiple logical constraints,
and need to note reporting requirements when human permis-
sion is necessary. For strategic-level task controllers, the ternary
tactical task sequencer using ethics constraints may allow
traceability and accountability for the full set of executed robot
tasks without loss of generality. ROEs and other expressions
provide ethical constraints and boundary conditions on robot
strategic planning and operational conduct that can work coop-
eratively and satisfactorily with humans.
VI. CONCLUSION
Humans given authority over potentially lethal robotic sys-
tems must be provided with realistic capabilities that enable
meaningful supervision, responsibility, and accountability.
AVCL mission definitions provide one such example: the ability
to define strategic level goals and tactical level tasks in a human-
understandable way, and in syntactically validatable form, that
a wide variety of robots might interpret and execute. MEA for-
malisms show that the underlying programming constructs are
tractable and sufficiently general to ensure broad feasibility.
MEO validation provides further abilities to logically evaluate
the semantic correctness and completeness of ethically con-
strained mission definitions. Together these capabilities provide
a practical framework for ethically grounded human supervision
of unmanned systems.
Specific conclusions and recommendations include the
following.
1) Ethical operation of autonomous systems requires hu-
man responsibility, accountability, and understanding.
Any decision to deploy potentially lethal force without
appropriate constraints or control may be dangerous, im-
moral, and illegal.
2) Lethality requires an ethical and legal basis for un-
manned system operations. Principles such as vicarious
liability clearly show that humans are both responsible
and also vulnerable. Robot self-preservation becomes
irrelevant when human life is at stake.
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3) Unmanned systems can remain supervised and semiau-
tonomous, even if communications are lost, if appropri-
ate guidance and checkpoints are provided.
4) Human clarity and cooperative action are essential for
supervising robots together with human teams.
5) Unmanned systems can be compatibly tasked in concert
with human teams.
6) Applied ethics equals defining tasks and observing con-
straints before executing potentially harmful tasks.
7) The mathematical concepts of DLs and ontologies, as
implemented by Semantic Web technologies, is proposed
to capture common logical and ethical relationships for
mission and task definition.
8) A mission-definition approach to constrained tasking is
actionable for all unmanned systems regardless of soft-
ware architecture.
9) For those choosing to adopt RBM for robot control, we
urge that the strategic level be fail-safe and exhaustively
testable.
10) Ethical constraints on robot mission execution are pos-
sible today. There is no need to wait for notional future
developments in AI. It is therefore a moral imperative
that ethical constraints in some form be introduced into
the software of all robots capable of inflicting unintended
harm to humans or property.
Ethical operation of robotic systems requires human account-
ability. In both the legal and moral sense, this implies that hu-
man operators be in a position to understand, and therefore
control, robot mission outcomes. This level of understanding
can be achieved through the satisfaction of three requirements:
operator understanding of high-level mission flow, mission de-
scriptions understandable to both human operators and target
vehicles, and mission descriptions consisting entirely of trusted
behaviors and constraints.
Algorithms cannot replace human responsibility. Even so, a
fully testable technology (such as that provided by the MEA
and MEO formalisms) allows for the assignment of human ac-
countability. Specifically, the MEA provides a mathematically
rigorous mechanism for mission definition and execution as an
exhaustively testable flow diagram. This approach ensures that
accountable operators can fully understand all high-level task
sequences before authorizing robot operations. The MEO em-
ploys DLs and Semantic Web technologies to provide strong
assurances that MEA mission definitions are semantically cor-
rect and fully executable by specific target vehicles.
By applying the best strengths of human ethical responsibil-
ity, repeatable formal logic and directable unmanned systems
together, these capabilities provide a practical framework for
ethically grounded human supervision of unmanned systems.
Much important work awaits.
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